依概率主动窃听下D2D通信的物理层安全研究

Research on Physical Layer Security for D2D Communications with a Probabilistic Active Eavesdropper

  • 摘要: 本文研究了依概率主动窃听下D2D通信的联合防窃听和抗干扰问题。由于主动窃听者可以依概率选择被动窃听或主动干扰,因此很难对抗。针对主动窃听者攻击方式的动态变化,本文采用稳健博弈学习方法来提高D2D通信的平均安全吞吐量,将一个蜂窝用户(CUE)和多个D2D用户(DUEs)之间的交互建模为一个领导者-多个追随者的斯坦博格博弈,引入了干扰代价机制描述蜂窝用户与D2D用户之间的竞争关系,设计了一个精确势能博弈描述多个D2D用户之间的协作关系。首先证明了底层子博弈的纳什均衡(NE)的存在性,并进一步证明了所提博弈的斯坦博格均衡(SE)的存在性。在此基础上,提出了基于随机学习自动机的稳健协同D2D功率控制算法,并验证其优于随机选择算法和D2D自私功率控制算法。

     

    Abstract: The joint anti-eavesdropping and anti-jamming problem of D2D communications with a probabilistic active eavesdropper is studied in this paper. Since the probabilistic active eavesdropper can launch passive eavesdropping or active jamming with a probability, it is hard to combat. Due to the dynamic change of the active eavesdropper’s attack modes, a robust game learning method is employed to enhance the average secure throughput of D2D communications. We formulate the interaction between a cellular user equipment (CUE) and multiple D2D user equipments (DUEs) to be an one-leader-multiple-follower Stackelberg game. An interference pricing mechanism is introduced to investigate the competitive relationship between the CUE and DUEs, and an exact potential subgame is designed to model the cooperative relationship among DUEs. We have proved that the existence of Nash equilibrium (NE) of the subgame in the lower layer, and further the existence of the Stackelberg equilibrium (SE) of the proposed Stackelberg game. Then a robust and cooperative D2D power control algorithm is proposed to converge to SE, which also outperforms the random and the selfish D2D power control algorithms.

     

/

返回文章
返回